They are hard to see now, as they are blocked from view by a new building under construction, but for almost 15 years those eccentric signs on the side of a 10-story building next to Yuanshan Station caught my eye as I rolled past on the Taipei MRT. 

“The Highest Yoga Tantra cultivated by lamas is essentially a yab-yum practice of sex,” says one. “Tibetan Buddhism is definitely not Buddhism and the lamas are definitely not Buddhist monks or nuns,” reads another. Say what?

Were they put up by a supporter of the Chinese Communist Party, out to damage the Tibetan brand? No! The real story, as I discovered, was that they were put up by the True Enlightenment Practitioners Association (TEPA), a non-political, Taiwan-based Buddhist organization, which owns several floors in the building.

The group’s leader, Xiao Pingshi, is known for his strong doctrinal views on Buddha’s true teachings, sometimes ruffling the feathers of other Buddhist groups.

But it was TEPA’s accusations of improper sexual behavior by Tibetan lamas with their disciples which created the most controversy, culminating in a 55-day jail sentence for Xiao Pingshi for defaming the Dalai Lama during his visit here in 2009.

However, all that was just a tempest in a teacup compared to the real sex abuse scandals that have rocked the Tibetan Buddhist community worldwide over the last few decades, which even some Tibetan Buddhists accuse the Dalai Lama of knowing about for years and failing to confront.

Could Xiao Pingshi and his followers actually have a valid point?

Dharma Disruptor

Tibet has had a very positive image in the west, starting with the Dalai Lama’s flight from communist-occupied Tibet in 1959 to Dharamsala, India, where he started his Tibetan government in exile.

Many Westerners discovered Tibetan Buddhism—along with other Eastern religious philosophies—traveling the Hippy Trail from Europe to India in the 1960s and 70s. This Western search for Eastern enlightenment was popularized by the Beatles. 

When the Dalai Lama was awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, the Tibetan exile community, with its constellation of Buddhist and free-Tibet activist groups around the world, became an iconic symbol of enlightenment and the fight against oppression.

Who then, other than the Chinese Communist Party of course, would dare attack them?

Enter Xiao Pingshi, born Xiao Xieren in 1944 into a Buddhist farming family in Changhua, Taiwan. After his military service, he moved to Taipei and started a law firm.

In 1985, he dedicated himself completely to Buddhism, studying and practicing several methods for five years, until, according to TEPA’s website, he achieved enlightenment. In September 1997, he founded the True Enlightenment Practitioners Association (TEPA) in Taipei.

(Xiao Pingshi per TEPA https://www.enlighten.org.tw/master-pingsxiao)

Since the 1950s, most of the various Buddhist branches and schools have generally adopted a diplomatic and collaborative approach toward each other. Xiao Pingshi—a prolific author of over 200 books on Buddhism—is an exception.

In Collected Doctrinal Critiques of the True Enlightenment Practitioners Association, Xiao called the practice of Chan Buddhism as taught by Dharma Drum Mountain a “false dharma,” and derided Fo Guang Shan’s brand of humanistic Buddhism as “worldly,” “superficial,” and “pseudo-Buddhism.” These are two of the largest and most influential Buddhist organizations in Taiwan.

TEPA publications assert that only Xiao Pingshi teaches the true dharma. Comments in online Buddhist forums have described TEPA as a closed doctrinal system that delegitimizes all other paths. His critics basically say: Who does he think he is, Buddha?

In 2003, the Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama—the Tibetan government-in-exile’s representative office in Taiwan—accused the group of spreading communist propaganda against Tibetan Buddhism, which TEPA denied, plausibly: the group has since been banned in China.

The vast majority of Taiwanese were oblivious to all this, and if they had been aware, would likely have laughed it off as mere theological squabbling.

But things started to heat up when TEPA’s criticisms directly targeted the Dalai Lama himself when he visited Taiwan in the wake of Typhoon Morakot.

The deadliest cyclone in Taiwan’s recorded history, Morakot slammed into southern Taiwan on August 7, 2009, causing 677 confirmed deaths, with 474 people killed by a landslide in Xiaolin Village, in a rural area of Kaohsiung.

The Tibetan leader visited later that month to say prayers and offer spiritual comfort to those affected. Most Taiwanese appreciated the gesture, especially those in the storm-ravaged south.

But as he conducted his prayer meetings, TEPA members were distributing leaflets in Taipei and Kaohsiung accusing him of promoting “tantric sex,” “false dharma,” and “demonic teachings.” TEPA also accused him of using his visit to Taiwan as a hypocritical attempt to rake in donations.

In November, 2010, the signs appeared on TEPA’s building on Chengde Road. Locals in the neighborhood were at first shocked, thinking they were promoting rather than warning against sexual practices in Buddhism.

But a community outreach program—and a warning to the building management committee not to take the signs down or face legal action—meant that they stayed up. Taipei City took no official action against TEPA.

In 2012, however, the Taipei District Court found Xiao Pingshi guilty of defamation for his 2009 comments against the Dalai Lama, and he was sentenced to 55 days in jail, convertible to a fine.  

(Buddhist News World blog article https://blog.udn.com/acewang3005/6875237)

After losing an appeal to the supreme court, TEPA was forced to make an official “clarification”—not an apology, they insist—but have carried on with their anti-Tibetan-Buddhism polemics to this day.

Hot Yoga

So, what exactly is Xiao Pingshi’s problem with Tibetan Buddhism?

The core issue is the inclusion of tantric practices. Tantrism originated in medieval India, and its infusion into Buddhism produced the form of Tantric Buddhism known as Vajrayana, prevalent in Mongolia, Bhutan, and Tibet.

It includes elements such as mantras and mandalas, intended to alter consciousness and offer a faster path to enlightenment. But It also has a sexy side.

Yab-yum (literally “father-mother” in Tibetan) is a visual representation of a male deity in union with his female consort. It symbolizes the union of female (symbolizing wisdom) and male (symbolizing compassion and skill), a foundational concept of tantrism.

Karmamudra refers to a tantric technique involving sexual yoga with a consort, either physical or visualized. It can be considered the physical embodiment of the yab-yum ideal, where the practitioner uses desire as a path to spiritual realization, not for erotic pleasure. (Hmm…)

The practice is to be done only by advanced practitioners, who are supposed to avoid normal orgasm, especially ejaculation.

For Xiao Pingshi and TEPA, the inclusion of tantric sexual practice totally disqualifies Tibetan Buddhism as a legitimate form of Buddhism.

Kristen, a member of TEPA’s English team, told me over cakes and coffee in the TEPA HQ’s basement lounge: “If they didn’t call themselves Buddhist, we wouldn’t comment on them.”

Lily, a dharma teacher for TEPA, made the point: “The teacher and disciple face each other naked. Are we to believe they don’t have sex?”

Even for those willing to accept Tantric Buddhism, ethics would require that the practices be consensual. As it turns out, this was far too often not the case.

Creepy Holy Men

It is well known that over the last few decades, investigations by media and NGOs have exposed numerous sex abuse cases in religious organizations. The Catholic Church is the most notorious for this.

On a smaller scale, similar revelations have emerged within other religious groups, including the Anglican Church, certain evangelical Christian denominations, Orthodox Jewish communities, Islamic madrasas, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Sikh community, and with some Hindu gurus.

Within the worldwide Buddhist community, it is the Tibetan Buddhists that have been most rocked by sexual scandals.

Here are just a few major examples:

Osel Tendzin and Vajradhatu

Osel Tendzin, real name Thomas Rich, (1943 – 1990), was the first Western dharma heir of Tibetan Buddhist master Chogyam Trungpa, himself known for alcohol use and sexual activity with students.

Osel Tendzin led a school in California called Vajradhatu, the precursor to Shambhala International, after Trungpa’s death in 1987.

Tendzin knowingly engaged in unprotected sex with male students while HIV-positive, without disclosing his status. At least one student died from AIDS-related complications.

The community was deeply shaken, especially as senior leaders were reportedly aware of the situation but failed to intervene.

(Tendzin’s obituary: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-08-27-mn-27-story.html)

Sogyal Rinpoche and Rigpa

Sogyal Rinpoche (1947–2019) was the founder of Rigpa, a global network of Tibetan Buddhist centers.

He gained prominence through his book The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, widely read in the West.

Accusations of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse spanned decades, with reports dating back to the 1970s. A 1994 lawsuit, which was settled out of court, alleged manipulation and assault under the guise of spiritual instruction.

In 2017, eight senior Rigpa students published an open letter detailing systemic abuse and manipulation, allegations confirmed by an independent report commissioned by Rigpa.

Senior Rigpa members were aware of misconduct and failed to act, wishing to avoid reputational damage to their leader and school.

In such cases, students are often afraid to report abusive gurus pushing unwanted sexual activity as “spiritual instruction” because of samaya, or sacred vows of secrecy. Breaking samaya is seen as spiritually catastrophic. Basically, if you rat on your guru, you go to hell—literally.

(Linked below is a powerful 2022 documentary about the abuse at Rigpa and the process of getting accountability.)

Speak No Evil

So where should we look for ethical guidelines for Tibetan Buddhist teachers, safeguards for disciples, and accountability for abusers? How about the Dalai Lama, whose spiritual authority and global profile would ensure that the message rang out, loud and clear.

By 2018, the sex scandals were damaging the reputation of Tibetan Buddhism, so the Dalai Lama began to speak out. But what said wasn’t always very reassuring.

One statement he made that year concerned an incident in which a group of 22 Western Buddhists had met with him in Dharamsala in 1993. They had raised concerns about sexual misconduct in Buddhism. But the Dalai Lama reported that: “I already did know these things, nothing new.”

So, he had known about the problem since before 1993, but had made no powerful public statements or undertaken any initiatives to deal with the issue until 2018. 

That same year, in the Netherlands, he met with victims and simply stated that “religious leaders should pay more attention.”

In addition, to date, investigative reporting and documentaries such as German media outlet DW’s Buddhism and Abuse – The Unspeakable Truth highlight that the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), remained “stubbornly silent” despite known cases of abuse.

In 2020, the CTA adopted a series of measures to counter sexual and gender-based violence While substantial, these were aimed at the Tibetan community in India and not at Tibetan Buddhist centers abroad.

The cat is out of the bag, however, and many Western Tibetan Buddhist centers have implemented reforms, such as safeguards, reporting systems, and psychological counseling.

A very Western sense of transparency and accountability seems to have enlightened Tibetan Buddhism in dealing with some nasty holdovers from their feudal mountain kingdom.

Concluding Opinion

So, is Xiao Pingshi right about Tibetan Buddhism? In the author’s opinion, No and Yes:

“No” in that this problem is not limited by any means to Tibetan Buddhists, while TEPA’s harshest polemics are.

In the Theravada (think “old school”) Buddhism, sexual abuse of young novices by senior monks has been reported many times in monasteries in Sri Lanka and Thailand.

(Article: Alarm Bells Sounded Over Child Abuse in Thailand’s Buddhist Temples – Buddhistdoor Global)

(Ph.D. Thesis: https://repository.canterbury.ac.uk/item/953w8/breaking-the-silence-about-institutional-child-abuse-in-sri-lanka)

And in the world of American Zen, here is one of several examples: Eido Tai Shimano, a Zen abbot who taught at the New York Zendo and upstate Dai Bosatsu Monastery, was accused of decades of sexual misconduct with female students, including coercive relationships and abuse of power.

A Statement on Eido Shimano Roshi

But “yes” because the intimacy and power imbalance of the guru-disciple relationship within Tibetan Buddhism, combined with tantric practices, can be an incubator for sexual abuse. It makes it more likely to happen, and harder to report.

Fortunately, there have been are no publicly recorded cases of sexual abuse to date within Taiwan’s large and growing Tibetan Buddhist community, consisting of some 300 Tibetan monks and 250,000 Taiwanese adherents.

One reason for this could be that most of the monks come through for short stays on rotation, limiting the development of close relationships with students.

But it is also possible that TEPA’s anti-Tibetan-Buddhist signs did actually save some vulnerable women from abuse.

Religious leaders and teachers are merely human, after all. The trouble starts when we forget this.

NOTE: The author contacted the Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama with a request for an interview, and also offered the organization an opportunity to respond to the points in the article or add an official statement to be included therein. However, the organization has so-far not offered any official comment. If they do so in the future, the article will be edited to reflect this.

Taiwan’s movement to recall KMT legislators en masse is unprecedented. What are the implications for national security if it fails?

After making it through the first two stages of the recall procedure, 24 recall elections for Kuomintang (KMT) representatives in the Legislative Yuan (LY)—Taiwan’s legislature—will take place on Saturday, July 26.

This scale of recall for elected officials is unprecedented not only in Taiwan, but worldwide

Another 7 recall votes are scheduled for August (and there may be others later on) but the July 26 votes are seen as the most significant.

According to the pro-Taiwan-autonomy Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and their allies, at stake is more than simply how Taiwan is run, but rather how the beleaguered island deals with the increasing threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bent on annexing what it regards as a rogue province of China.

The DPP is giving major support to the recall, which is being conducted by several civil society organizations.

Currently, the KMT have 52 seats in the LY, the DPP 51, and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP)—which has been working in coalition with the KMT—another 8. Plus, there are 2 pro-KMT independents. Thus, the KMT/TPP coalition has 62 of the 113 total seats, a comfortable majority.

If half of the 24 recalls are successful, the KMT would lose 12 and the total number of effective LY seats would go down by those 12, giving the DPP 51 out of 101 seats—but only temporarily. In districts where the recall effort succeeds, there must be a byelection for a new legislator within three months.

These could go either way. But if the DPP can flip six seats, they gain full control of the Legislative Yuan.

How did we get here? This extreme level of recall was sparked by equally extreme actions by the KMT and their allies in the LY.

It all started after the January 13, 2024 elections, when Lai Ching-te from the DPP was elected president.

That same election saw the KMT—together with their allies-for-now the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP)—gain a majority in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) for the first time since 2016.

This new KMT/TPP bloc came roaring out of the gates with an aggressive new bill to give the LY the right to summon individuals for hearings—including members of the military with sensitive information—with stiff penalties for non-compliance.

When Taiwan’s Constitutional Court issued an injunction against parts of the bill, the KMT/TPP coalition amended the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, raising the quorum to 10 judges (there are currently only 8) and then refused to approve the appointment of any new ones. This paralyzed the court, making it powerless to block any future KMT/TPP bills.

The alliance then went on to pass another bill redistributing some tax revenue from the central government to local governments, most of which are KMT controlled. They also clipped the proposed central government budget by 6.6%, and temporarily froze parts of military spending.

These moves sparked outrage among DPP allies, who called them an unconstitutional power-grab that would aid Beijing. Mass protests erupted outside the LY—the so-called “Bluebird Movement”—in May, 2024, which created momentum that led to the mass electoral recall campaigns, also known as Great Recall Wave, which began in early 2025.

In response, the KMT tried their own recall efforts on 15 DPP legislators, with no results to date other than getting over 100 of their recall workers charged for forgery and related crimes.

One pro-KMT activist summoned for questioning by the court appeared wearing a Nazi armband, carrying a copy of Mein Kampf, and performed Nazi salutes in front of reporters, implying that Lai was an authoritarian like Hitler for repressing his opposition.  

His satirical theatrics didn’t go over well. But the KMT side may have the last laugh if recall efforts fail, or if the subsequent byelections don’t grant the DPP a majority.  

It is a complicated situation, but one key issue stands out: How would an emboldened and resentful KMT impact President Lai’s national security agenda intended to counter the growing threat from China? Would they serve as a Trojan horse for CCP infiltration in Taiwan, as the DPP and its allies have alleged? At first glance, it seems at least plausible.

Since former Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, there have been regular military rehearsals for a Taiwan blockade or invasion by the rapidly-modernizing People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as well as daily grey-zone harassment by air force jets and navy ships maneuvering close to Taiwan.

There have also been incessant cyber-attacks, espionage, cognitive warfare, lawfare, and influence operations by the CCP.

All of this has ramped up significantly since Lai took office.

In 2024, 64 people in Taiwan were charged with espionage-related offences. This was more than in the previous two years combined. About 60% of those charged were retired or active-duty military personnel.

Three soldiers from Lai’s own security detail were sentenced in March 26, 2025 for leaking confidential data to Chinese intelligence.

In response to this, on March 13, 2025, Lai stated that China qualified as a “hostile foreign force” under the Anti-Infiltration Act of 2020, and announced his Seventeen National Security Measures. One of these was the restoration of military tribunals for active-duty personnel involved in espionage against Taiwan.

However, despite this clear pattern of Chinese intelligence penetration, KMT Chairman Eric Chu denounced the move, accusing Lai of “stigmatizing the military” and unfairly portraying the armed forces as being infiltrated by China.

Chu also claimed the Democratic Progressive Party’s past support for the abolition of military courts in 2013 had “weakened the armed forces and allowed communist infiltration.” This is a bit bizarre, since the abolition occurred in August 2013 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, and when the KMT had an absolute majority in the LY.

Chu has consistently painted Lai as an autocrat intent on eliminating all opposition to his power.

Rather than accept that mistakes had been made in the KMT’s efforts to recall DPP legislators, Chu said: “What Lai Ching-te has been doing to the opposition is exactly what Hitler did” during his dictatorship, accusing Lai of using judicial investigations to “eliminate” the opposition and establish a dictatorship.

This over-the-top rhetoric even sparked sharp rebukes from the German and Israeli government representatives in Taiwan.

What specific future actions related to cross-Strait security might the KMT/TPP coalition take if they retain their control of the LY?

The following is just conjecture, but it based on the KMT’s pattern of behavior in the LY since the last election.

One possibility is a modification of the Cross-Strait Act (1992. Last amended 2019) such as redefining the Taiwan Strait as “Internal Waters” as recently proposed by KMT Legislator Chen Yeong-kang and 18 coalition lawmakers.

This could be framed as intended to avoid conflict in the tense waters around Kinmen and Lienchiang (Matsu) island groups. But critics assert that it risks legitimizing Beijing’s claim that cross-strait issues are “domestic” rather than international.

The Act could also be modified to loosen restrictions on cross-Strait contact, or to remove or weaken reporting requirements for contact with PRC entities. This could be sold as promoting positive exchanges between China and Taiwan, but could also allow for greater penetration by the CCP’s United Front Work Department.

The LY coalition might even seek expanded legislative oversight of cross-Strait policy, requiring the Executive Yuan to seek Legislative Yuan approval for defense and China-related strategies. Framed as civilian oversight, this could also hamper executive flexibility and empower pro-China legislators.

Of course, just because these ideas have been suggested by some KMT members does not mean they will gain the approval of the caucus leadership.

But regardless of how the recall pans out, the KMT/TPP will probably continue with negative messaging to undermine Lai’s popular support at home, which could complicate his efforts to signal to the world—especially the Trump administration—that Taiwan is stepping up for its own defense.

This raises the question even among neutral observers: Whose side is the KMT on? Taiwan’s or China’s?  The most likely answer is “China’s”—the Republic of China, that is, and not, they say, the People’s Republic of China or the Communist Party of China . How realistic or sustainable that is, given the PRC’s ambitions and growing strength, remains an open question.

Stay tuned for Part 2: The KMT’s enigmatic “China Dream“

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Hi all! Here’s the link to my latest project. Feel free to share it with friends. A proper blogpost will be coming soon.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS A NEW VERSION OF THIS GUIDE (V2.0) AVAILABLE, POSTED MARCH 3, 2025. PLEASE GO TO THE MORE RECENT POST.

Map of the action at Tamsui, 8 October 1884, by Captain Garnot

It was a great pleasure to do these two podcasts with my old friend John Grant Ross, founding member of Camphor Press, and writer of Formosan Odyssey, his first Taiwan book, Taiwan in 100 Books – his best Taiwan book, in my view – and other works. John was also an editorial consultant for my own book, Taiwanese Feet: My walk around Taiwan. It was good to get him out of his dusty town in Chiayi and up here in the bustling metropolis of Taipei for some intelligent conversation and a few beers.

John Ross and Eryk Michael Smith have been doing some fantastic podcasts on the Formosa Files. The format for the two episodes I did with them is a bit different, as they take the form of a “walking and talking tour”. The subject matter is the Battle of Tamsui, October 2nd to 8th, 1884, which was part of the Keelung Campaign of the Sino-French War, August 1884 to April 1885. I thought it would be helpful to add some visuals to augment the listening experience, if only after the fact. So please find below the links to the podcasts, and some maps and pictures of the sites mentioned in them.

A note on photos: Most are unattributed, meaning they are mine or John’s or copyright-free pics from the Internet. But a few of them, the best ones, are from KJ Dickson, an excellent photographer who I have collaborated with on another project. More about that project and a link to KJ’s site at the bottom.

NOTE: Embedded links are not working, so to listen to the podcasts, please just go to the Formosa Files website and scroll down.

https://www.formosafiles.com/

The two episodes are: (These are not links)

S3-E19 – Two Johns Take a “Walking Tour” in Historic Tamsui 淡水 – Part One

S3-E20 – John Groot and John Ross Walk and Talk Historic Tamsui 淡水 – Part Two

Scroll down to S3-E19 first.

Visual references

Here are a few Google Earth images. The first one is an overall look at riverside Tamsui for your reference. The second one is the main area covered in our first podcast, marked with numbers, lines and images. Below that will be some text naming and explaining the numbered locations. Following that will be another marked-up Earth image detailing the sites of the second podcast, followed again by explanatory text.

INFORMATION FOR ABOVE MAP

1: Shalun Beach: Landing site for the French Marines on Oct. 8, 1884

2: Location of French ships shelling Tamsui on Oct. 2, 1884

3: Fisherman’s Wharf. Area inside dotted line is reclaimed land.

4. Mound: Used to signal retreat of French forces just before noon on Oct. 8

5. Position of Qing underwater barrier of sunken barges (brown), submerged sea-mines (red) with their detonation cables stretching back to the sea-mine engineers’ camp.

6. Fort Blanc (White Fort), Qing defensive and artillery position.

7. Sea-mine engineers’ camp

8. Fort Neuf (New Fort): Main Qing encampment and artillery position in Tamsui.

9. Wadianbi: Small bridge over a stream where the French were finally stopped and forced to retreat.

10. Danjiang Bridge, under construction

(THE ABOVE NUMBERS DO NOT REFER TO THE MAP DIRECTLY BELOW)

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INFORMATION FOR MAP ABOVE

1. Tamsui customs wharf

2. Hobe Port

3. The Red Fort aka Fort San Domingo

4. Aletheia University (Zhenli Daxue) formerly Oxford College. On Zhenli Street (upper left dotted line), and next to many other historical buildings.

5. Tamsui Customs Officer’s Residence (Little White House)

6. Mackay Street (lower right dotted line) and Mackay’s first residence in Tamsui (line on right under number)

7. Tamsui Presbyterian Church, next to the Tamsui Mackay Clinic

8. The triangular park with the statue of George Leslie Mackay

9. Fuyou Mazu Temple

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A FEW CLARIFICATIONS

There are a few points as follows to add to the second podcast, S3 E20, for greater accuracy and context. The numbers are the times of the relevant sections in the podcast.

9:18 Re: HMS Cockchafer: A cockchafer is a kind of beetle.

10:34 The English name for Zhenli Daxue is Aletheia University. But most people in Tamsui call it Zhenli University.

14:02 There were no reported attacks on foreign residents in Tamsui during the battle. However, after the battle, there was a wave of wider anti-foreign sentiment, and threats made against Mackay, who felt compelled to move to Hong Kong until April 1885, when he returned to Tamsui.

NOW, HERE ARE SOME PICTURES OF THE SITES MENTIONED IN THE PODCAST

French warships bombard the Chinese coastal defences at Tamsui, 2 October 1884; from left to right the gunboat Vipère, the ironclad Triomphante, the cruiser d’Estaing and the ironclad La Galissonnière.

Myself looking historical

The Mound: Art on the Tamsui LRT. (Photo by KJ Dickson)

The Marines’ landing site on Shalun Beach (Photo by KJ Dickson)

An artist’s impression of the landing. More LRT art. (Photo by KJ Dickson)

How Shalun Beach usually looks.

Commemorative art near the site of the river mines barrier. Bridge construction visible in background.

Commemorative art at Wadianbi, where the French were forced to retreat.

Fort San Domingo: aka the Red Fort

Oxford College, on the campus of present-day Aletheia University

Tamsui Customs Officer’s Residence aka Little White House

Shell crater from October 2nd, 1884 at Little White House

Top end of Mackay Street

George Leslie Mackay’s first residence in Tamsui in 1872

Tamsui Presbyterian Church and the original Mackay Clinic (Photo by KJ Dickson)

From left to right: French Admiral Amédée Courbet, commander of the Far East Squadron; John Grant Ross, content creator; and Liu Mingchuan, Imperial Commissioner (and later governor) of Taiwan.

A SPECIAL THANKS TO KEN DICKSON

Going by the photographer’s name “KJ Dickson”, Ken is an old friend, a lovely fellow, and a great photographer. His pictures look far better than the pale renderings of them I’ve managed here. Check out his professional website by clicking on the link below:

https://www.lookthroughthelens.com/

Ken and I collaborated on an article on the Battle of Tamsui for Centered on Taipei, the magazine of the Community Services Center. The link to that article is here:

Click to access CoT-2022-10.pdf

The article starts on page 17.

ENDING NOTE: The next blog post will be a special one about the family of Dr. Hong-Ming Cheng, who have deep historical roots in Tamsui.

And finally, a shameless plug for my book: Taiwanese Feet: My walk around Taiwan. You can find it on Amazon. Or email me at taiwanese DOT feet AT gmail DOT com.

See you next time!

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It was a great pleasure to work with Ken Dickson, photographer, and the entire editorial team of Centered On Taipei, the magazine of the Community Services Center in Taipei. Please follow the link below to read the article on pages 16-20.

https://www.communitycenter.org.tw/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CoT_10_2022-e-1.pdf

The Battle of Tamsui, Oct. 2-8 1884, was part of the Sino–French War.

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